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Abstract
Recent literature has pointed out that information asymmetries may
be the reason for the poor performance of structural credit risk models to
t corporate bond data. It is well known in fact that these models lead to
a strong undestatement of the credit spread terms structure, particularly
on the short maturity end. Possible explanations stem from strategic
debt service behavior and, as discovered more recently, the problem of
accounting transparency. This raises the possibility that some of these
aws could be reconducted to a sort of peso problem, i.e. that the
market may ask for a premium in order to allow for a small probability that
accounting data may actually be biased (Baglioni and Cherubini, 2005).
In this paper we propose a modied version of the Duan (1994,2000) MLE
approach to structural models estimation in order to allow for this peso
problem e¤ect. The model is estimated for the Parmalat case, one of
the most famous cases of accounting opacity, using both equity and CDS
data.
1 Introduction
Structural models of credit risk are considered a very elegant approach to the
evaluation of corporate liabilities. Elegance stems from the fact that prices are
obtained from the analysis of the structure of the balance sheet of the obligor
rm and the dynamics of its assets. The main advantage is that these models
are full of economic information content, while the so-called reduced form
models are only based on statistical assumptions concerning the probability
distribution of default events and the recovery rate, that is the amount that the
investor expects to recover in case of default. Of course, the richer economic
content in structural models comes at the cost of a loss of exibility with respect
to reduced form models, and of a poorer t to market data.
Structural models are reconducted to the seminal paper by Merton (1974),
even though the famous Black and Scholes (1973) model was already devoted to
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the evaluation of corporate liabilities, as was explicitely recognised in the title.
The key idea in structural models is that corporate liabilities, such as equity
and debt, are actually positions in options. So, equity can be considered a call
option written on the assets of the rm with a strike price equal to the face value
of debt and the credit risk component of corporate bonds can be thought of as
short position in a put option with same underlying and strike, the so called
default put option. A rst typical aw of structural models of credit risk is
that predicted credit spread are much lower than market quotes for reasonable
values of leverage and volatility of assets. Several answers have been proposed
as possible solutions to this problem. Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) suggest
that the owner of the rm may engage in a strategic rescheduling process to
exploit the bankrupcy costs at the expense of bondholders. Along the same
lines, Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996) allow the owner of the rm to
terminate the process in such a way as to optimize the value of equity, again at
the expense of debt.
An alternative explanation for the failure of structural models to t the data
stems from the fact that the value of the rm is not directly observed and this
lack of transparency may a¤ect market prices. In this spirit Cherubini and Della
Lunga (2001) propose a conservative assessment of the probability of default
by using a default probability interval, in line with the MaxiMin-Expected-
Utility framework in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). However, this approach is
not able to account for another typical aw of structural models: the strong
understatement of credit spreads for short maturities. A typical credit spread
term structure in the Merton model shows a hump and zero intercept. The
latter feature is particularly disturbing and it is due to the main assumption on
which the model was built, that is the representation of the value of the rm as
an adapted di¤usion process. The need to account for higher credit spreads for
shorter maturities can be achieved either by allowing for a jump process in the
value of the rm (Zhou, 2001), that is dropping the di¤usion process assumption,
or by relaxing the adapted process hypothesis. The latter route was rst followed
by Du¢ e and Lando (2001) (see Yu, 2005 for empirical evidence), who propose a
model with endogenous bankrupcy in which the market is assumed to observe a
noisy signal of the value of the rm at discrete times, namely when balance sheet
reports are released. An approach in the same spirit is followed by Cherubini and
Baglioni (2005) who account for the fact that the signal may not only be noisy
due to meaurement errors, but it may also be biased because of deliberate fraud.
In their model rational Bayesian investors would account for this possibility by
subtracting part of the value released from the report, and the value of corporate
liabilities is a mixture of the values they can take both in the case of presence
and absence of fraud.
The fact that the value of the rm is not directly observed has also given
rise to a stream of literature on the estimation of the relevant parameters of
the model from market data. Actually, the real peculiarity of this application
of the option pricing model stems from the fact that the derivative products
(equity stock, for example) are traded on liquid markets and their prices can be
observed in real time, while the underlying is neither traded or observed. So, the
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problem is not only to estimate implied volatility as in standard option pricing
applications, but also the implied value of the underlying asset, the value of the
rm in this case. In his pioneer work Duan (1994) proposed a ML procedure on
transformed data to address this problem. Further elaborations on this subject
were provided by Ericsson and Reneby (2003), Brockman and Turtle (2003),
Duan, Gauthier and Simonato (2004), Bruche (2004). An alternative line of
research has used a di¤erent approach, based on simultaneous calibration of
the value of assets and their volatility on a non-linear two equation system of
the value of equity and its volatility (Vassalou and Xing, 2002); this iterative
method can be easily extended to account for default before maturity, leading
to the standard KMV approach (Crosbie, 2002).
The goal of this paper is to investigate the issue of empirical performance
of structural models of credit risk. A rst question is whether all information
should be only found in equity prices, as it is implicitley assumed in most of the
literature quoted above. In the same line as in Bruche (2004) we try to estimate
structural models on both equity prices and the credit spread. Of course, the
main reason why most of the attempts at estimating structural models use
equity data is because it is well known, as we said before, that this approach
is not borne out by credit spread data. The second question is then whether
recent models on uncertain infomation are able to provide a better t to credit
spread data. In particular, we look for support to the idea of a peso problem
in corporate securities data, as predicted in the Baglioni and Cherubini (2005)
model quoted above: the market may assign some small probability to the event
that the balance sheet reports of a rm, and its whole investor relationship
style, could be misleading, and the rm is already bankrupt, in spite of any
favorable report or analyst presentation. It is reasonable to expect that the
market may require a premium for that. To explain the joke in the title, some
rms and obligors may be leaving deadwandering around issuing debt, and
when they are proved to be acutally dead they may bite investors to death.
Examples are the Enron and Worldcome cases (to quote only the most famous)
in the US and Parmalat in Europe. It is from the equity and CDS data of
Parmalat, throughout two years before the nal crisis, that we look for an
answer to this question.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews structural models,
particularly those that will be used in the empirical work. In section 3 we review
the MLE approach to the problem and we apply it to the di¤erent models and
to the di¤erent corporate securities (equity and debt). In section 4 we present
the data set used and the results obtained. Section 5 concludes.
2 Structural models
Let us describe the basic structure of a corporate securities model. At time t0 a
rm is issuing debt to nance a project that will be completed at time T , when
it will be worth V (T ). It is assumed that the value of assets follows a geometric
brownian motion
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dV (t) = V (t) dt+ V (t) dz (1)
with  and  constant drift and di¤usion parameters and dz a Wiener process.
This means that V (T ) is log-normally distributed. We also rule out estimation
risk and model risk, assuming that the parameters of the process are common
knowledge, and that the no-arbitrage condition holds. Then, both the volatility
parameter  and the market price of risk  are assumed to be common knowl-
edge, so that the drift of the assets is recovered from the usual no-arbitrage
restriction  = r +  where r is the instantaneous risk-free rate, assumed to
be constant.
2.1 Default at maturity: Merton model
In the seminal paper by Merton (1974) default is assumed to be possible only
at the end of the contract, when the value of assets V (T ) is observed. De-
faultability of debt is then represented by the non-linear pay-o¤ at maturity
D (T ) = min (D;V (T )) ; meaning that if the value of the rm is not su¢ cient
to cover repayment of the debt, the creditors will be allowed, only then and
not before, to take over the rm at no cost. The value of corporate debt can
be decomposed as D (T ) max (D   V (T ) ; 0), that is a default-free bond and
a short position in a put option, written on the asset for a strike equal to the
nominal value of debt: it is this short position, also called default put option,
that measures the default risk in the price. The call option with same under-
lying and strike E (T ) = max (V (T ) D; 0) represents the value of equity. It
may be veried that Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in this setting.
A clarifying note is in order about the notation. Merton rescaled all of the
results in the model by the value of assets, leading to the denition of a key
variable, called the quasi-debt-to-rm value ratio (or quasi-leverage) dened as
 (t) =
exp ( r (T   t)D)
V (t)
(2)
Here we nd more natural to rescale everything by the discounted value of debt
(the quasi-value of debt), so that as the underlying asset (the value of the rm)
we prefer to use v (t)  1= (t): all prices expressed in lower case will be assumed
to be rescaled in the same way.
The value of equity and debt is recovered using the standard Black and
Scholes formula
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e (v (tk) ; tk)  E (v (tk) ; tk)
exp ( r (T   tk))D = v (tk)N (d1) N (d2) (3)
d (v (tk) ; tk)  D (v (tk) ; tk)
exp ( r (T   tk))D = 1 + v (tk)N ( d1) N ( d2) (4)
d1 =
ln (v (tk)) + 
2 (T   t)

p
T   t
d2 = d1   
p
T   t
Notice that the value of debt can also be represented as
d (v (tk) ; tk) = 1  [ v (tk)N ( d1) +N ( d2)] (5)
emphasising the nature of credit risk as a short position in a put option. It is
the value of this put option that we will use in the empirical work.
2.2 Covenants: Black and Cox model
An important extension of the Merton model, particularly consistent with the
assumption that some imperfect signals of the value of the rm can be observed
before the maturity of debt, is the possibility that default could occur before
that date. Black and Cox (1976) were the rst to amend the model in this
direction. The idea is that default may occur before maturity if some covenant
written on debt is triggered. The covenant is typically referred to the relative
size of the value of the rm with respect to the amount of debt. Following the
Black and Cox approach, the covenant in its simplest form is represented as the
inequality
bv (tk)    1 (6)
So, when the value of the rm is signalled to be too low with respect to the
discounted value of debt, default is triggered. The presence of covenants, of
course, reduces the default risk component of debt and the credit spreads. The
reduction of risk depends on the value of parameter ; the model can be proved
to converge to the standard Merton model as  gets close to zero. If the value of
the rm were perfectly observed in continuous time, as assumed in the original
model, the covenant would tend to eliminate the risk of default as  gets close
to 1. Of course, given the parameter, the e¤ect of default risk reduction also
depends on the monitoring frequency and the information content of the signal.
A comment is in order on the di¤erences with respect to the Merton model
and the impact of our assumption of observing the signal at discrete times. If
the covenant could be monitored in continuous time, the value of equity would
be a call barrier option of the down-and-out type with zero rebate: that is, the
option granted by the equity would cease to exist as soon as the default barrier
were activated. In the case of continuous monitoring of the covenant the pricing
formula for equity is readily available in the standard option pricing literature
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e (v (tk) ; tk;) = e (v (tk) ; tk) (7)
 
"
v (tk)


v (tk)
2
N () 


v (tk)
2 2
N

   
p
T   tk
#
 =
ln
 
2=v (tk)

+ 2 (T   t)

p
T   t
 =
1
2
+
r
2
A more realistic assumption is instead that the barrier could be monitored,
through the signal, only at discrete dates ft0; t1; :::; tNg. This makes equity a
discrete barrier option in which typically the barrier is observed at xed intervals
of time, say every quarter or every semester. A closed form solution to this
pricing problem was found by Heynen and Kat (1996). However, evaluation
involves the computation of joint normal distributions in dimension N + 1;
which is not available in closed form. For this reason, it may be useful to resort
to approximations suggested in the literature. Broadie, Glasserman and Kou
(1997) propose a strategy based on the displacement of the barrier in the formula
above: so, denoting  the time interval between monitoring dates, they suggest
e (v (tk) ; tk;; ) ' e (v (tk) ; tk; e) (8)e   exp ( 0:5826)p
2.3 A peso problemmodel: structural models with gar-
bling
Recent literature has extended this model to account for the fact that the value
of the rm, that is the underlying asset of the options involved in structural
models (equity and the default put option), is not observed in continuous time.
These models typically depart from standard literature in two ways. First,
information on the value of assets is assumed to be available at discrete times
ft0; t1; :::; tNg, that is when the balance sheet reports are issued. Second, the
value of assets is not directly observed by the market, but it must be inferred
from a garbled signal s (tk), k = 0; 1; 2; :::; N . Only at the nal date T , or when
a default event occurs, the value of the rm will be observed. Before that, the
signal may be simply noisydue to imperfect observation (Du¢ e and Lando,
2001), or it may even be distorted because of fraudolent behavior by rms
managers (Baglioni and Cherubini, 2005). Here in particular we focus on the
latter possibility.
To give a more clear description of the idea, consider the possibility that
a signal s (tk) > 1 be issued, even though the true state is v (tk) < 1, to hide
a possible state of nancial distress at the advantage of management careers,
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or even the entrepeneur private wealth (as in the Parmalat case). It may also
happen that signal s (tk) < 1 be issued, while in the true state it is v (tk) > 1, for
example to solicitate debt rescheduling. In the Baglioni and Cherubini approach
Bayesian rational investors accounting for this possibility update their prior
probability evaluation leading to price reactions smaller than those predicted
by the full information model. In particular, their model shows that the price
can be obtained as a mixture of di¤erent states, under which the full information
value of the securities is computed.
While referring the reader to the original work for the description of the
structure of signal used and the consequent derivation of the model, we want to
focus here on its intuitive content. Suppose a signal s (tk) = h > 1 is released.
Conditional on the true value being actually greater than debt, the signal is
assumed to be precise. However, we assume that some probability is given
to the event that the report is false, and the true state is v (tk)  1 instead.
This probability is indeed recovered as a posterior probability from a Bayesian
updating process.
As a result, the value of equity following the release of the news is
be (v (tk) ; tk j h) = f (v (tk) > 1 j h) e (h; tk)+(1  f (v (tk) > 1 j h)) e (v (tk)  1; tk)
(9)
where f (v (tk) > 1 j h) is the probability that the value of asset is actually
greater than debt (or the default boundary), so that the report is truthful.
e (v (tk)  1; tk) represents instead the expected value of equity, conditional on
the report being false: actually, this value would be zero in a standard structural
model with covenants such as the Black and Cox model described above, but it
needs not be zero in the presence of default at maturity or bankrupcy costs and
debt rescheduling possibility. The same holds for the value of debt, which gives
bd (v (tk) ; tk j h) = f (v (tk) > 1 j h) d (h; tk)+(1  f (v (tk) > 1 j h)) d (v (tk)  1; tk)
(10)
Notice that now d (v (tk)  1; tk) represents a proxy for the recovery rate implied
in the price: if the report were suddenly discovered to be false and the rm were
in default, the value of debt would actually boil down to the recovery rate.
Finally, the same holds for the value of the rm. Remember in fact that by
Modigliani-Miller theorem we have e (h; tk)+d (h; tk) = h and e (v (tk)  1; tk)+
d (v (tk)  1; tk) = v (v (tk)  1; tk) so that we may compute
bv (v (tk) ; tk j h) = f (v (tk) > 1 j h)h+ (1  f (v (tk) > 1 j h)) v (v (tk)  1; tk)
(11)
Notice that, as both equity and debt are worth less in the bad state than in
the good one, the e¤ect of garbling is to prevent equity and debt from reacting
completely to the announcement of a value v (tk) = h. There is always a small
probability that the good signal be deceptive, so that the worse scenario does
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actually take place. This possibility endowes the model with the usual pecu-
liarity of raising the credit spread curve particularly in the short end, as in the
Du¢ e and Lando approach.
3 Maximum likelihood estimation
Maximum likelihood estimation of the dynamics of the underlying asset in cases
where it cannot be directly observed on the market was rst proposed by Duan
(1994,2000). Let us focus on our specic problem. To begin with the simple
case, asssume that a sample of observations on the asset value of the rm was
directly observed on the market at discrete dates ft1; t2; :::; tNg. If its dynamics
is that of a geometric brownian motion
dV (t) = V (t) dt+ V (t) dz (12)
we know that the conditional distribution is
ln

V (ti)
V (ti 1)

 N     1=22 i; 2i (13)
with i = ti   ti 1, i = 2:::N . The log-likelihood in this case would then be
LV (V (ti) ; i = 1; 2:::N; ; ) =  N   1
2
ln (2)  N   1
2
ln2  
NX
i=2
lnV (ti)
 1
2
NX
i=2

ln

V (ti)
V (ti 1)

  i
2
(14)
Notice that we could impose further economic restrictions in the model. The
no-arbitrage condition requires in fact that  = r + . This restriction could
be important in a panel data estimation of the model, but even in our case could
give an idea of a plausible range of values for the drift: this is very useful mainly
because it is well known that one of the aws of these model is represented by
the imprecise estimation of the drift term. Of course, the likelihood could be
written in the same way for the value of the rm rescaled in terms of discounted
value of debt, v (ti), as in the analysis before: one has only to keep in mind that
the restriction implied by no-arbitrage in this case would be  = .
Let us now get to the heart of the matter and assume that the value of the
rm is not observed directly, but can only be evaluated through a transformation
g (v (ti) ; ti). Denote by g the partial derivative of the function with respect to
variable v (ti). It may be proved that in this case the likelihood can be written
as
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L (g (v (ti) ; v (ti)) ; i = 1; 2:::N; ; ) =  N   1
2
ln (2)  N   1
2
ln2 (15)
 
NX
i=2
ln v (ti; ) 
NX
i=2
ln jg (ti; )j
 1
2
NX
i=2

ln

v (ti; )
v (ti 1; )

  i
2
where v (ti; ) is the value of assets implied in the value of g (v (ti) ; ti) given
that the volatility is . In the typical application we would set g (v (ti) ; ti) =
e (v (ti) ; ti) and the values used to estimate the model are equity prices. In
this case, sticking to the standard Merton model for simplicity, we have g =
N (d1). Nowadays for many rms an appraisal of the credit risk is also available
from very liquid markets, such as some credit derivatives market. From CDS
quotes, for example, it is possible to estimate the market value of debt and the
corresponding default put option. In this case, if one observe an estimate of
g (v (ti) ; ti) = d (v (ti) ; ti) he can compute g = N ( d1). Using a shorthand
notation one could then write
L (g (v (ti) ; v (ti)) ; i = 1; 2:::N; ; ) =  N   1
2
ln (2)  N   1
2
ln2 (16)
 
NX
i=2
ln v (ti; ) 
NX
i=2
lnN (1d1 (ti; ))
 1
2
NX
i=2

ln

v (ti; )
v (ti 1; )

  i
2
where 1 is an indicator function taking value 1 if the data observed is equity
and - 1 if the data debt.
Finally, the peso probleme¤ect that was addressed above would imply
cg (v (ti) ; ti) = fN (1d1 (ti; v (ti))) + (1  f)N (1d1 (ti; v (ti)  1)) (17)
where N (1d1 (ti; v (ti)  1)) is the integral of the derivative over the region
v (ti)  1.
4 An application to the Parmalat case
In this section we apply the methodology above to estimate the value of Par-
malat assets and their volatility, allowing for the market to give some probability
to the event of fraud. Actually, in the wake of the scandal in December 2003
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the debate was focussing on the fact that Parmalat had been traditionally fol-
lowing an investor relationship policy particularly opaque. It is then interesting
to address the question whether this lack of transparency was actually priced
by the market. Furthermore, Parmalat was a listed company, and its stock had
been included in the Italian blue-chips index, so that information about it was
processed in a very liquid market. Finally, as one of the most relevant obligors,
Parmalat was among those nameson which credit risk was actively traded
on the CDS market. Obviously, the latter is more a wholesalemarket than
that of equity. It is then interesting to check whether the two markets did share
the same information. This is all the more relevant also in view of the lively
discussion on the question whether banks were actually aware of the nancial
distress situation of Parmalat.
4.1 The data
We collected data on equity and 5-year CDS mid-quote for the years 2002-2003.
The data is depicted in Figure 1. The data show the story of the two hotyears
of Parmalat. Both markets record the condence crisis in February 2003, when a
new bond issue by Parmalat was hastily withdrawn from the market, and when
analysts reports were highlighting the mistery of Parmalat liquidity endowment.
After a period in which the situation calmed down, so that both the stock prices
and the CDS quotes move back toward their standard values, the new nal crisis
outbroke at the end of November. On December 8, Parmalat defaulted on a 150
million euro bond. The day after, Standard&Poors downgraded Parmalat to
junk status. Finally, on December 19 the story of default turned into one of
outright fraud when Bank of America announced that 3.9 million dollars of
liquidity that Parmalat claimed to have deposited in that bank were not simply
there.
From this data, using the quantity of stock and the value of debt reported
in the balance sheet, we computed the time series of our data of interest. As
we have no information concerning the term structure of debt, we assume it to
be all on the 5-year maturity, and we evaluate its market value by discounting
it by the 5-year swap rate increased by the CDS spread. The idea behind this
assumption is that one could have actually swapped the whole credit risk on
the Parmalat debt at the cost of that spread. This is clearly an approximation,
both because not all the debt was actually on the 5-year maturity, and because
there is evidence that this arbitrage relationship is not perfect at all. In Figure
2 we plot the value of quasi-debt, the estimated value of debt, their di¤erence,
that is the default put option, and the value of equity capital.
4.2 Estimates and results
The strategy we follow is to estimate drift and volatility of the maket value
of Parmalat by the maximum likelihood procedure with transformed data dis-
cussed above, assuming two di¤erent models: i) the standard Merton model,
10
Figure 1: CDS spread and equity
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Figure 2: Equity, default put, quasi-debt and debt
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ii) the Merton model with garbling. The analysis is carried out both on a
subsample stopped at the default date (December 8) and on the whole sample
reaching the end of December. In the model with garbling, the probability of
fraud is estimated along with the drift and volatility of the stochastic process.
The model is estimated on equity data and then checked against the value of
CDS spreads: this will enable to check whether the market for protectionon
the name Parmalat was quoting prices that were actually more expensive than
those implied by stock prices.
Table 1. Parmalat rm value: MLE estimates
Sample Drift Volatility f (v (tk) > 1 j h)
08/12/2003
 0:0099651
(0:0549867)
0:0995914
(0:0079003)
 
08/12/2003
 0:016538
(0:0719129)
0:11472252
(0:0315613)
0:80006038
(0:3077854)
22/12/2003
 0:172803
(0:146902)
0:18192321
(0:0367712)
0:9999998
(0:2660050)
The estimates presented in Table 1 show that fraud probability plays an
important role in the specication of the model. In the subsample, the stock
price dynamics implies a 20% probability of fraud. If the estimate is instead
carried out on the whole sample, this probability is found to be zero because
the default event did actually take place. The estimated volatility of the assets
is similar in both models when the subsample is considered, being around 10-
11%: this gure is much lower, and more realistic than the estimates one would
obtain by using the value of the rm computed adding equity and the appraised
market value of debt. The estimate of drift is not statistically signicant as it
is usual to nd in this kind of estimates.
The estimates show a typical case of peso problem: before the default event
on December 8, the market was assigning some probability to the event that such
default could occur. What is actually surprising is that this 20% probability
is substantial with respect to that one would expect in a peso problemcase.
In line with this e¤ect, instead, the probability disappears as soon as the event
is included in the sample. But more surprises have yet to come. The biggest
one is in Figure 3. Here we compare the credit risk premium implied by the
CDS quotes, which is reported in terms of di¤erence between the value of quasi-
debt and its estimated market value, and the premium predicted by the two
estimated models. The picture shows that the standard Merton model largely
underestimates the value of the credit risk premium, as it is usual in structural
model applications. It looks like there would have been unexploited arbitrage
opportunities in the CDS market versus the equity market, or else that the
two markets have been segmented, carrying di¤erent information. Allowing for
a peso problem in the estimates reverses this evidence, and these arbitrage
opportunities disappear: in most of the sample the credit risk premium implied
in equity prices is even higher than that implied by CDS quotes.
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Figure 3: Merton model, market price and model with garbling
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Figure 4: Implied value of the rm
Another striking result emerges from Figure 4, in which we depict the implied
value of the rm obtained from the estimates. The value of Parmalat is the
linear combination of a higher state value and the lower state in the event of
mis-reporting and fraud. It is really surprising that the value of the rm in the
lower state is actually almost constant around a value which is 20% of the value
of quasi-debt: this gure is actually very close to that reportedly found in the
Italian market.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we show that accounting for mis-reporting may actually reconcile
structural models with market data. The e¤ect of mis-reporting is modelled
as a peso problem, that is the market allows for a small probability that a
catastrophic event, such as a fraud case, could actually take place. We show how
to amend Duan (1994, 2000) maximum likelihood estimation on transformed
data to allow for such problem and we apply it to the Parmalat case, one of
the most famous fraud events ever. The results strongly support the peso
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problemhypothesis. The market was assigning a 20% probability to a scenario
in which the rm was already in a default state. Conrming this result, we
nd that while CDS appear to be largely overvalued once the standard Merton
model is estimated on equity prices, such mis-pricing disappears if we allow for
fraud probability. Furthermore, computing the value of the rm under such
catastrophic event yield a value which is about constant around 20% of the
quasi-debt value, a gure which is very much consistent with the recovery rate
value which is typically reported for the Italian market.
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